Policymaking by Proposal: How Agencies Are Transforming Industry Investment Long before Rules Can Be Tested in Court by Coleman, James W.
POLICYMAKING BY PROPOSAL: How AGENCIES ARE
TRANSFORMING INDUSTRY INVESTMENT LONG BEFORE RULES
CAN BE TESTED IN COURT
James W. Coleman*
INTRODUCTION
In June 2015, electric power utilities won final victory in a four-year
battle: the United States Supreme Court struck down the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency's (EPA) mercury emissions rule from power plants under the
Clean Air Act, in Michigan v. EPA.' The Court held that EPA should have
considered the cost of regulating before deciding it was "appropriate and nec-
essary" to regulate mercury emissions from power plants under the Clean Air
Act.2 And the victory may have felt sweet because it vindicated arguments
that the power industry had been insisting on since the rule was proposed in
March 2011.
But the victory was ultimately empty: utilities had already begun up-
grading or closing down coal plants to ensure they could meet the now-in-
validated standards. These steps would be costly to reverse. Adding insult to
injury, senior EPA official Janet McCabe filed an official blog post designed
to "explain EPA policy," noting that, regardless of the utilities' win in court,
"many plants have already installed controls and technologies to reduce their
mercury emissions."' EPA's spokeswoman, Melissa Harrison, was even
more blunt: "EPA is disappointed that the Court did not uphold the rule, but
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1 Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015).
2 Id. at 2707-08.
3 Patrick Ambrosio, Supreme Court MATS Decision Unlikely To Affect Power Company Compli-
ance Plans, BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.bna.com/supreme-court-mats-nl7179925
278/.
4 Janet McCabe, In Perspective: the Supreme Court's Mercury and Air Toxics Rule Decision, EPA
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this rule was issued more than three years ago, investments have been made
and most plants are already well on their way to compliance."'
In the meantime, EPA had proposed yet another controversial rule de-
signed to encourage existing coal plants to retire, known as the "Clean Power
Plan."' Why would a utility invest in re-opening a coal plant with yet another
rule on the table that could force it to close? Even if an agency's rules are
likely to be reversed eventually, reinforcing proposals can effectively set the
agenda for industry investment-a business would have to be foolhardy to
invest in facilities that the federal government was looking to forbid. This
article documents this phenomenon, labeling it "policymaking by proposal."
Over the past years, several trends in administrative law and investment
patterns have worked together to boost policymaking by proposal. As con-
gressional lawmaking has declined, the executive has pursued increasingly
aggressive modes of making policy without Congress. Policymaking by pro-
posal is just one facet of this general trend.
At the same time, judicial minimalism in administrative law has given
agencies even more power to set the agenda for industry while repeated ap-
peals work their way through the courts.' In Michigan v. EPA, even though
EPA had not "considered" the costs of its mercury rule, it had "estimated"
the costs and benefits of the rule and, controversially, estimated that the ben-
efits of its rule were greater than the costs.'o The Court, however, declined to
say whether EPA's controversial estimate was valid; because the agency had
5 Jeff McMahon, Nearly All US. Coal Plants Now Comply With The EPA Mercury Rule That Was
Shot Down By Supreme Court, FORBES (July 10, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/
2016/07/1 0/nearly-all-coal-plants-now-comply-with-the-epa-mercury-rule-that-supreme-court-shot-
down/#75918d66f56b.
6 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Sta-
tionary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1,430, 1,430 (Jan. 8, 2014) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, 98).
7 This effect is so strong that some utilities are holding off on investment in fossil fuel industries
that might be favored by the new Trump administration based on the danger that the next administration
will adopt contrary regulations punishing fossil fuel investments. Emily Holden, Utilities See Demise of
Climate Rule, Still Cut C02, E&E NEWS CLIMATEWIRE (Feb. 15, 2017), http://www.eenews.net/
climatewire/stories/1060050087 (reporting on a speech made by the Chairman of the Arkansas Public
Service Commission, Tim Thomas, who said that "even if President Trump's EPA rescinds the [Clean
Power Plan], the next administration will pursue much stricter climate standards. . . . [So] utilities in
Arkansas are still focused on cutting carbon").
8 For more examples of how the executive is pushing to expand the power of the administrative
state while avoiding traditional checks in Congress and the Court, see Michael S. Greve & Ashley C.
Parrish, Administrative Law Without Congress, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 501, 502 (2015).
9 See, e.g., Kate Sheppard, EPA Chief Says She's Not Worried About Supreme Court Mercury
Ruling, HUFFINGTON POST (July 7,2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/07/07/gina-mccarthy-su-
preme-court-mercury n_7746034.html; Ken Silverstein, Supreme Court's Mercury Ruling Unlikely To
Remove The Heat On Coal, FORBES (July 1, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/
2015/07/01/supreme-courts-mercury-ruling-unlikely-to-remove-the-heat-on-coal/print/.
10 Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2721 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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not yet considered its estimate, the Court technically did not need to say
whether the estimate was valid in order to strike down the rule.'" Predictably,
EPA has responded to the Court's ruling by relying on its estimate that the
rule's benefits exceed its costs.1 2 It will take another year for the D.C. Circuit
to decide whether EPA's estimate is lawful, and yet another year for the Su-
preme Court to address the issue, if it chooses to do so." So if the Supreme
Court ultimately rejects the mercury rule proposed in March 2011, it is very
unlikely that industry petitioners will know before 2018.
Furthermore, some of the industries currently in regulators' crosshairs
are particularly susceptible to policymaking by proposal. Nowhere is this
more evident than among power utilities in states with regulated rates, where
utilities can and must petition boards to approve rate hikes that will pay for
the investments that they make to comply with new agency proposals. Take
the example of a state-regulated power utility considering whether to invest
$3 million dollars in a pollution control technology such as activated carbon
injection that would, in practice, be required to comply with an EPA pro-
posed rule for mercury emissions."' The utility can bring a rate case with the
state utility board, asking to raise customer rates to cover the $3 million dollar
outlay for the technology required to comply. A rate case may damage the
company's public relations and use precious political capital, but it ensures
that the utility's increased costs are passed on to consumers.*
Alternatively, a utility could put off the upgrade and fight the rule in the
comment process and eventually in court-but if it loses, it could face serious
penalties that it would not be able to recover in a rate case. As a result, regu-
lated-rate industries will almost always invest for compliance even when they
intend to fight a proposed rule. In fact, economic theory suggests that regu-
lated utilities should, if anything, invest more than would be socially desira-
ble in environmental upgrades.'" So long as their state ratemaking boards will
" Id. at 271 1.
12 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Supplemental Finding That It Is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate
Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 81 Fed. Reg.
24,420 (Apr. 25, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63).
13 Murray Energy Corp. filed a petition to have the D.C. Circuit review the EPA's April 2016 Sup-
plemental Findings in July 2016. Statement of Issues to be Raised by Petitioner, Murray Energy Corp. v.
Envtl. Prot. Agency (D.C. Cir. July 25, 2016) (No. 16-1127). See also White Stallion Energy Ctr. v. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam), rev'd sub nom. Michigan v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). And, in the meantime since the Supreme Court's reversal of White Stal-
lion Energy Ctr, the D.C. Circuit has remanded the invalidated rule without vacatur, so it remains in effect.
White Stallion Energy Ctr, No. 12-1100, 2015 WL 11051103, at *1 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 15, 2015)
("ORDERED that the proceeding be remanded to EPA without vacatur of the Mercury and Air Toxics
Standards final rule.").
14 U.S. GAO, GAO-10-47, CLEAN AIR ACT: MERCURY CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES AT COAL-FIRED
POWER PLANTS HAVE ACHIEVED SUBSTANTIAL EMISSION REDUCTIONS 14 (equipping carbon injection
system averaged $3.6 million, ranging from $1.2 million to $6.2 million (cost in 2008 dollars)).
15 It is conventional wisdom among economists that, despite the political downsides of pushing for
regulated rate increases, regulated industries systematically over invest in capital to expand the investment
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approve investments in new environmental controls, utilities should be happy
to invest in any and all new proposals for pollution control. Certainly, by the
time that these industries can overturn a regulatory initiative in court they
will have no incentive to unwind previously approved investments, since
they will already have had their higher pricing approved.'"
Agencies also increase the power of their proposals by pushing the date
of compliance earlier and the date that the rule can be challenged later. For
example, when EPA proposed its Clean Power Plan greenhouse gas rules for
the years 2020 to 2030,17 it proposed that two thirds of the reduction take
place in the very first year, 2020.'" How could electric utilities achieve two
thirds of that reduction in the first year of the standard? Easy: EPA assumed
that utilities would begin shutting down coal power plants immediately, shut-
ting down 11 GigaWatts of coal electricity by 2016, six years before the rule
on which they can receive their designated return. E.g., Lion Courville, Regulation and Efficiency in the
Electric Utility Industry, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. ScI. 53, 53-54 (1974); Jim Rossi, The Political Econ-
omy of Energy and Its Implications for Climate Change Legislation, 84 TULANE L. REv. 379, 383-84
(2009); Robert M. Spann, Rate of Return Regulation and Efficiency in Production: An Empirical Test of
the Averch-Johnson Thesis, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 38, 38-39 (1974). With a mandated rate of
return on investments, the only way that regulated industry can increase profit is by investing more. Rossi,
supra. Thus capital investments in new equipment for environmental compliance are great opportunities
to increase company profits. Douglas N. Jones & Richard A. Tybout, Environmental Regulation andElec-
tric Utility Regulation: Compatibility and Conflict, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 31, 44 (1986) ("Other
things being equal, and with a rate of return at least as high as utility stockholders could otherwise earn,
the utility has an interest in adding to property, as long as regulators include that property in the rate base
.... This fact makes any investment that the regulatory commissions find 'used and useful' for power
generation, including pollution control equipment, more attractive to the utility. Environmental agencies
and other parties of similar interest should take this incentive situation into account." (footnotes omitted)).
16 In fact, some utility lawyers hinted that, given the uncertainty this would create for investments
already begun, it might be better for the rule to simply remain in place. Gavin Bade, What the Supreme
Court MATS Ruling Means for Utilities and the EPA Clean Power Plan, UTILITY DIVE (July 2, 2015),
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/what-the-supreme-court-mats-ruling-means-for-utilities-and-the-epa-
clean-po/401707/.
17 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,839 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). This timeline is necessary to meet the promises the U.S. is giving other countries in
climate negotiations. Daniel Cohan, New Report Shows Importance of Clean Power Plan, THE HILL (May
23, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/energy-environment/280868-new-report-shows-im-
portance-of-clean-power-plan (U.S. emissions may stop falling "in the absence of the Clean Power Plan.
. . [according to] scenarios modeled by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) ... [which] predict
that power plant carbon dioxide emissions would be 20 percent lower with the Clean Power Plan than
without it."); Joel Kirkland, Paris Talks: Obama's A-Team Touts Clean Power Plan's Enforceability,
ENERGYWIRE (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060029064 ("EPA's Clean Power Plan to
cut emissions across the electricity sector is a core policy piece supporting the U.S. commitment ahead of
the Paris talks .... ).
18 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generat-
ing Units, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,936.
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came into effect." That is, EPA assumed industry had already begun invest-
ing in new infrastructure to meet its demands: installing more renewable gen-
eration, more electric transmission to transport wind and solar resources to
demand centers, more natural gas fired power plants, and more gas pipelines.
Additionally, EPA pushed back the date the rule could be challenged by de-
laying publication of the final rule until the end of October 2015.20 If the
challenge to the Clean Power Plan had progressed at the same rate as the
challenge to EPA's mercury rule, industry would have been able to obtain a
Supreme Court decision by February 2018-years after utilities would have
had to make investments to comply.2 ' Of course, EPA's efforts at policymak-
ing by proposal were frustrated by an unprecedented stay from the Supreme
Court, which stayed the rule until it could be challenged in the D.C. Circuit.2 2
However, the Supreme Court has never before stayed an agency rule before
it had been evaluated by the lower courts, and there is little reason to think
that the Court alone can police agencies' abuse of their power to set the
agenda for industry investment.23
Finally, these problems are exacerbated by the increasing lead times
necessary for investment, a long-term trend in the United States driven by
19 See Resp't's Reply to Appl. for Immediate Stay of Final Ageny Action at 153a-56a, West Vir-
ginia v. Envtl. Prot. Agency (2016) (Nos. 15A773, 15A776, 15A778, 15A787, & 15A793) (Decl. of Ste-
phen Schwartz). See also Pet'rs' Appl. for Immediate Stay of Final Agency Action at 20, 20 n.5, West
Virginia v. Envtl. Prot. Agency (2016) (Nos. 15A773, 15A776, 15A778, 15A787, & 15A793) (Decl. of
Karen Harbert). The average coal plant can produce 228 Megawatts of power, so this would correspond
to about 48 average coal plants. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 27 GIGAWATTS OF COAL-FIRED CAPACITY
TO RETIRE OVER NEXT FIVE YEARS (2012) http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.php?id=7290 ("Another 13 coal-fired units with generating capacities of 200 MW or greater are
expected to retire in 2015-this is close to the average size of all coal units existing in 2011 (228 MW).").
20 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60); Andrew Childers, EPA Expects to Publish Clean Power Plan in October, BLOOMBERG, (Sept. 2,
2015), http://www.bna.com/epa-expects-publish-nl 7179935454/.
21 Michigan v. EPA was decided 40 months after the mercury rule was published. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric
Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, In-
dustrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9,304, 9,304 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63).
22 West Virginia v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 136 S. Ct. 1000, 1000 (2016) ("The [EPA's] 'Carbon Pol-
lution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units,' 80 Fed,
Reg. 64,662 . .. is stayed pending disposition of the applicants' petitions for review in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and disposition of the applicants' petition for a writ
of certiorari, if such writ is sought.").
23 JOSHUA LINN, ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, RF DPl6-21, AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT
OF THE SUPREME COURT'S STAY OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 2
(2016) ("To our knowledge, the Supreme Court has never before acted to freeze implementation of a
regulation after a federal appeals court has declined to do so and before the appeals court has completed
its evaluation of the merits of challenges to the rule.").
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several factors. First, procedural requirements, such as the environmental im-
pact statements required by the National Environmental Policy Act, require
increasingly time-consuming reviews that slow down investment.24 Second,
increasingly powerful local opposition to development, led by "not-in-my-
backyard" or "NIMBY" groups, has stymied a wide range of construction
projects from environmentally sensitive facilities, 2 5 to energy transport, 2 6 to
even seemingly innocuous projects such as new housing.27 Developers facing
these extended timelines must take account of agency rules that may come
into force before they can complete construction.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I documents three more areas
where the administration has repeatedly used proposals designed to require
substantial changes in industry investment: the Renewable Fuel Standard,
new air pollution standards for power plants, and regulations of health insur-
ance providers that must have their rates approved long before they are im-
plemented. Part II considers how policymaking by proposal is changing the
rulemaking process: pushing agencies to use the proposal as a not-quite-re-
alistic opening bid rather than a middle-of-the-road preview of the final rule,
and pushing industry to find innovative ways to attack the legitimacy of
agency proposals. Part III acknowledges that agencies are unlikely to aban-
don this tactic and suggests ways that other stakeholders-such as courts,
state policymakers, and Congress-can restore the balance of power in the
administrative state. Specifically, this final part suggests that state utility
24 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward A Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government's En-
vironmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 918-19 (2002) (alterations in the original) (citations
omitted) ("[T]he typical [Environmental Impact Statement] runs to hundreds of pages in length, and is
costly and time consuming to produce. A recent study for the Federal Highway Administration ... found
that on average an [Environmental Impact Statement] required 3.6 years to complete, with some taking as
long as twelve years. And the average completion time actually grew longer over the thirty-year period of
the survey, from 2.2 years in the 1970s to 5 years in the 1990s. The consequence of open ended infor-
mation production requirements enforceable through relatively easy access to judicial review, then, is that
the effective standard for the quantity of information that must be produced in an [Environmental Impact
Statement] is set extremely high, and the process is painfully slow and costly.").
25 Barak D. Richman & Christopher Boerner, A Transaction Cost Economizing Approach to Regu-
lation: Understanding the NIMBY Problem and Improving Regulatory Responses, 23 YALE J. REG. 29,
32 (2006) ("Since the mid-1970s, ... the NIMBY problem in the United States has become more than a
common nuisance . . . . For solid and hazardous waste facilities, the siting problem has become so acute
that some scholars have suggested that the 'NIMBY' syndrome is perhaps better characterized as
'BANANA'-'Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anything"').
26 James W. Coleman, Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1357, 1377-
78 (2014).
27 Timothy B. Lee, NIMBYs are Costing the US Economy Billions, Vox, (Jan. 22, 2015),
http://www.vox.com/2014/7/15/5901041/nimbys-are-costing-the-us-economy-billions (citing Chang-Tai
Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Why Do Cities Matter? Local Growth andAggregate Growth 2-3 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21154, (2015)). See also Jason Furman, Chairman, Council of
Econ. Advisors, Remarks at the Urban Inst.: Barriers to Shared Growth: The Case of Land Use Regulation
and Economic Rents 3 (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/
20151120_barriers_shared growthland use regulationand economicrents.pdf.
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boards treat federal agency proposals with more skepticism when approving
regulated utility investments, that courts strike down rules that do not leave
adequate time for compliance, and that Congress create a procedure that al-
lows industry to automatically stay a rule if it is willing to post a significant
bond to support its prediction that the rule will ultimately be struck down.
I. REGULATION BY THREAT: How AGENCIES USE AGGRESSIVE
PROPOSED RULES TO DRIVE INDUSTRY INVESTMENT
EPA's mercury rule and the Clean Power Plan are just two of many
examples of proposed rules used to drive industry investments. This section
documents three more examples that are currently salient: two more from
EPA-new source performance standards for greenhouse gas emissions from
coal power plants and the Renewable Fuel Standard for ethanol content of
motor fuels and new health care rules under the Affordable Care Act.28 It
concludes by considering how these examples fit into other policymaking
alternatives designed to evade judicial review, such as direct final rulemak-
ing, exercises of enforcement discretion, or cases of deliberate inaction or
delay like the repeated delays in decisions on the proposed Keystone XL
pipeline and the Dakota Access pipelines..
A. New Source Performance Standards for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from New Fossil-Fuel-Fired Power Plants
Perhaps the best example of the economic power of proposals is EPA's
source performance standard for new coal power plants, which was first an-
nounced in 20 10,29 proposed in 2012," and then withdrawn and re-proposed
28 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Renewable Fuel Standard Program: Standards for 2014, 2015, and 2016 and
Biomass-Based Diesel Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 33,100, 33,100 (proposed June 10, 2015) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80); Envtl. Prot. Agency, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions from New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1,430, 1,430 (pro-
posed Jan. 8, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, 98); Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Certain Preventive Services under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501, 16,501 (proposed Mar.
21, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
29 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Proposed Settlement Agreement, Clean Air Act Citizen Suit, 75 Fed. Reg.
82,392, 82,392 (proposed Dec. 30, 2010) (announcing proposed settlement agreement, addressing green-
house gas emissions standards for power plants).
30 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Station-
ary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392, 22,392 (proposed Apr. 13, 2012) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
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in 2014.31 EPA published the final rule in late 2015.32 New source perfor-
mance standards adopted under Clean Air Act § 111(b), are uniquely suited
to policymaking by proposal because these standards, once finalized, apply
to any source built or modified after the date upon which the standard was
proposed." Thus, once a rule is proposed, it is foolhardy to build a source
that does not comply with the proposal, because the source will be retroac-
tively forbidden unless the rule is changed before it is finalized.
EPA designed its proposals to threaten any realistic proposal for a new
or modified coal power plant with legal ruin. The initial 2012 proposal was
for a 1,000 lb C0 2 /MWh standard, which could only be achieved by carbon
capture and storage, a technology that is not economically viable in the ab-
sence of massive government support.34 EPA then withdrew the rule in 2014,
and proposed an only slightly more reasonable standard of 1,100 lb
C0 2/MWh, a standard that would require partial carbon capture and storage,
again going beyond anything that was commercially feasible.3 5 EPA would
have had a hard time defending either of these standards in court; the Clean
Air Act requires the administrator to set a standard based on "adequately
demonstrated" technology-and unsubsidized carbon capture and storage
has not been commercially demonstrated.3 6 Despite this shaky legal basis,
few investors would relish the prospect of building a power plant that would
be retroactively unlawful under the proposal as soon as EPA finalized its
rule-doing so would mean that the only way the investment would have a
hope of paying off is if the courts invalidated the final rule.
The EPA itself 'seemed to realize its initial proposals were too aggres-
sive: the final rule sets a 1,400 lb C0 2/MWh standard for new sources and a
31 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Sta-
tionary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. at 1,430.
32 Entl. Prot. Agency, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modi-
fied, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510, 64,510
(Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, 98).
33 See Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604 § 111(b) (Dec. 31, 1970) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2) (2012)).
34 Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. at 22,394. See also, e.g., Jennie C. Stephens, Carbon Capture and
Storage: A Controversial Climate Mitigation Approach, 50 INT'L SPECTATOR 74, 80 (2015).
35 Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. at, 1,433. See also Stephens, supra note 34, at 80.
36 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(a)(1). See also Stephens, supra note 34, at 80.
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1,800-2,000 lb C02 /MWh standard for modified sources.17 But in the mean-
time, EPA's proposals effectively ensured that investors would not consider
building-or even modifying-a coal power plant in the United States."
B. The Renewable Fuel Standard
Another area where EPA has relied on proposals rather than finalizing
rules that it must defend in court is the Renewable Fuel Standard,39 which
indirectly requires oil companies to blend a specified proportion of renewable
fuels like ethanol into the fuels they sell.40 The Renewable Fuel Standard is
somewhat unusual because instead of directly requiring that transportation
fuels contain a specified percentage of renewable fuel, it mandates that a
minimum volume of renewable fuel be sold in the United States each year.4 '
EPA must make a rule each year that sets a required percentage of renewable
37 Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modified, and Recon-
structed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,512. The EPA was likely
also concerned that a court decision striking down its new source performance standards would endanger
its Clean Power Plan, which is dependent on these standards.
38 DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD
401 (2012) ("Electric power is a classically long-term business. A power plant built today may be oper-
ating 60 to 70 years from now. It is also . .. the most capital-intensive major industry in the United States.
Fully 10 percent of all capital investment in the United States is embedded in the power plants, transmis-
sion lines, substations, poles, and wires that altogether make up the power infrastructure.").
3 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2) (2012).
40 The text of 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2) simply directs EPA to "ensure that" Americans consume
specified volumes of gallons of ethanol between 2006 and 2022, but to implement the standard, EPA
predicts how much fuel will be sold each year and then mandates a percentage of ethanol that it believes
will ensure sale of the billions of gallons required by the statute.
41 For a fuller explanation of the Renewable Fuel Standard see James W. Coleman, How Cheap is
Corporate Talk? Comparing Companies' Comments On Regulations With Their Securities Disclosures,
40 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 47, 56-65 (2016). Mandating purchase of a particular fuel is arguably a more
severe government intervention in free markets than a simple mandate that fuel sold meet a particular
standard for including biofuel . See Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Lochner, and the Individual Mandate, 91
B.U. L. Rev. 1723, 1744 (2011) ("After all, as Randy Barnett has explained, government mandates to
purchase-or to engage in other behavior-are, when viewed from the standpoint of individual liberty,
simply 'more onerous than either economic regulations or prohibitions."' (quoting Randy E. Barnett,
Obamacare 's Individual Mandate is a Dangerous New Federal Power, Washington Examiner (Feb. 15,
2011), http://washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/opeds/2011/02/obamacares-individual-mandate-danger-
ous-new-federal-power)). See also David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A. Casey & Jack M. Balkin, A Healthy De-
bate: The Constitutionality ofan Individual Mandate, 158 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 93, 101 (2009) (Rivkin
and Casey arguing that a mandate to purchase health insurance is "congressional trickery" that "is bad for
our democracy's health" because "[i]f Congress can mandate the purchase of health care insurance, it can
similarly impose, under the Commerce Clause guise, an infinite array of other mandates, ranging from
health club memberships to a requirement to consume a given quantity of fruits and vegetables annu-
ally.").
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fuel for transportation fuels like gasoline and diesel.4 2 EPA uses an estimate
of how much fuel of all kinds will be sold in the United States and then man-
dates that fuel providers sell a percentage of renewable fuel that would ensure
that the required volume of renewable fuel is sold.43
Congress directed EPA to set the annual standard each year one month
before the start of the year in which it would apply.4 EPA however, has often
ignored these deadlines, finalizing rules after their effective date and requir-
ing companies to comply retroactively. For example, the final rule for 2010,
which also included some requirements for 2008 and 2009, was not published
until March 26, 2010.45 The 2011 and 2012 rules were only a few weeks late,4 6
but the 2013 rule was not finalized until August 2013,47 and the 2014 rule
was so late that EPA decided to just roll it into the 2015 rulemaking.48 Then,
after further delay, EPA rolled both rules out in the 2016 rulemaking.4 9
As a practical matter, oil companies have been forced to comply with
the proposed rules in anticipation of EPA later finalizing rules that are some-
what similar. But without a final rule, the oil industry has few options for
42 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Renewable Fuel Standard Program,
72 Fed. Reg. 23,900, 23,903 (May 1, 2007) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80) ("In order to ensure the
use of the total renewable fuel volume specified for each year, the Agency must set a standard for each
year representing the amount of renewable fuel that each refiner, blender, or importer must use, expressed
as a percentage of gasoline sold or introduced into commerce. This yearly percentage standard is to be set
at a level that will ensure that the total renewable fuel volumes shown in Table I.B-1 will be used based
on gasoline volume projections provided by the Energy Information Administration (EIA).").
43 Id.
44 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(3)(B)(i) (2012) ("Not later than November 30 of each of calendar years 2005
through 2021, based on the estimate provided under subparagraph (A), the Administrator of the [EPA]
shall determine and publish in the Federal Register, with respect to the following calendar year, the re-
newable fuel obligation that ensures that the requirements of paragraph (2) are met.").
45 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Changes to Renewable Fuel Stand-
ard Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 14,670, 14,675, 14,877-78 (March 26, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
80).
46 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 2011 Renewable Fuel Standards,
75 Fed. Reg. 76,790, 76,791-92 (Dec. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80); Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 2012 Renewable Fuel Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 1,320, 1,321 (Jan.
9, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
47 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 2013 Renewable Fuel Standards,
78 Fed. Reg. 49,794, 49,795 (Aug. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
48 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Delay in Issuing 2014 Standards for the Renewable Fuel Standard Program,
79 Fed. Reg. 73,007, 73,008 (Dec. 9, 2014).
49 Id. at 73,007-08 (delaying standards on basis that "[t]he proposal has generated significant com-
ment and controversy, particularly about how volumes should be set in light of lower gasoline consump-
tion than had been forecast at the time that the Energy Independence and Security Act was enacted, and
whether and on what basis the statutory volumes should be waived" and highlighting commenters' "con-
cerns regarding the proposal's ability to ensure continued progress towards achieving the volumes of re-
newable fuel targeted by the statute"); Envtl. Prot. Agency, Renewable Fuel Standard Program: Standards
for 2014, 2015, and 2016 and Biomass-Based Diesel Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 33,100, 33,101 (pro-
posed June 10, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
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recourse in the courts." And, on the one occasion that the oil companies chal-
lenged EPA's later-issued rulemakings as retroactive regulation, the D.C.
Circuit held that retroactive rulemaking was reasonable and allowed by stat-
ute." As a result, EPA has again found it more convenient to rely on proposed
rules to set its agenda, rather than finalizing rules that could be challenged in
court.
C. Health Care
Although changes to health care plans do not require the lead-time nec-
essary for investment decisions in the energy industry, they can present sim-
ilar issues because of federal and state rules that mandate publication and
review of health care plans long before they are implemented.52 As in the
energy industry, regulators are increasingly capitalizing on this necessary
lead-time by requiring companies to comply with controversial regulations
before those regulations can be tested in court.
For this reason, before the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality
of the Affordable Care Act ("ACA") in 2012, several companies committed
to maintain some of the Act's key provisions even if the Court struck it
down." Specifically, companies said they would still offer coverage to par-
ents' children up to age twenty-six and would provide free preventative care
regardless of the Court's decision.5 4 This decision is not surprising because,
like regulated utilities, these insurers had already received approval for
higher rates from state regulators that reflected the ACA's changes." Once
these higher rates had been approved, there was little time or incentive to go
back and lower rates even if the court determined that these coverages were
50 See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U.
PENN. L. REV. 923,951-54 (2008) ("Federal courts generally have extremely limited jurisdiction to 'com-
pel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed' under section 706(1) of the [Administra-
tive Procedure Act].") (citation omitted).
51 Nat'l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass'n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 630 F. 3d 145, 162-66 (D.C. Cir.
2010) ("[A]ny primary retroactive effects were implicitly authorized ... and EPA reasonably balanced
any retroactive effects against the benefits of applying the . . . regulations to the full calendar year.").
52 Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Rate Increase Disclosure and Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 29,964,
29,964 (May 23, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 154). See also, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-2-17(c)
(2016); ALASKA STAT. § 21.51.405(b) (2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-143(b) (2016); ARK. CODE.
ANN. § 23-79-109(b)(1) (2016).
53 Lewis Krauskopf, U.S. Health Plans to Keep Some Reforms, However Court Rules, REUTERS
(Jun. 11, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-unitedhealthgroup-reform-idUSBRE85AO3Y201206
11.
54 Id.
55 Cf Jacquie Lee & Jayne O'Donnell, Regulators Approve Higher Health Premiums to Strengthen
Obamacare Insurers, USA TODAY (Oct. 19, 2016), http://usat.ly/2eq0qLK; Brad Tuttle, 8 States Where
Obamacare Rates Are Rising by at Least 30%, TIME: MONEY (Oct. 18, 2016), http://time.com/
money/4535394/obamacare-plan-premium-price-increases-2017-states/.
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not required, especially given the limited competition in most states' insur-
ance markets.
Even when the government knew that ACA provisions might be in dan-
ger from the courts, it took steps to ensure that companies could not backtrack
on their preparation to comply. For example, the government knew courts
might hold that the contraceptive mandate, a provision of the ACA, violated
the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993," as the Supreme Court
ultimately decided in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby." In the confusion before the
Supreme Court's decision, some objecting religious organizations prepared
to comply until the courts ruled, while other organizations refused to com-
ply." As religious organizations struggled with this decision, the Department
of Health and Human Services issued a bulletin that offered a safe harbor
from enforcement for one year, but only to religious organizations that had
not already complied with the contraception mandate, effectively preventing
companies that had reluctantly complied from benefiting from the safe har-
bor."
D. Policymaking by Proposal and Other Methods ofA voiding Judicial
Review
Policymaking by proposal can be thought of as one component of a
larger trend toward executive workarounds to a hostile congress, which has
variously been described as "Adhocracy,"o "Kludgeocracy,"" or simply,
"Administrative Law Without Congress."6 2 In that sense, it is of a piece with
other policies designed to leverage executive power to influence private de-
cisions without any of the broader political acceptance implied by legislation
56 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141 107 Stat. 1488 (November 16, 1993)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb (2012)).
57 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014) (holding that the Department
of Health and Human Services could not force closely held corporations to provide insurance coverage
for methods of birth control that violated their sincerely held religious beliefs, as it violated the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act).
58 Sara Elisabeth Smith, The Women's Preventative Services Provision of the ACA and For-Profit
Corporations: Must They Comply? 9-16 (May 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Seton Hall
Univ., Law School Student Scholarship, Paper No. 581), http://scholarship.shu.edu/student-scholarship/
581 (detailing the status of varied organizations bringing lawsuits against the contraceptive mandate be-
fore the Supreme Court's decision).
59 Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act,
77 Fed. Reg. 16,501, 16,502-03 & 16,502 n.5 (proposed Mar. 21, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt.
147).
60 PHILIP A. WALLACH, To THE EDGE: LEGALITY, LEGITIMACY, AND THE RESPONSEs To THE 2008
FINANCIAL CRISIS 119 (2015).
61 Steven M. Teles, Kludgeocracy in America, 17 NAT'L AFF. 97, 97 (2013).
62 Greve & Parrish, supra note 8, at 501.
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that has won congressional support after standing up to the public scrutiny
and committee procedures generally followed by the House and Senate.
As with policymaking by proposal, these policies are disproportionately
aimed at industries with long investment timelines, particularly the energy
industry. Three examples in the energy industry will illustrate the diverse
forms in which the administration is now seeking to influence industry in-
vestment without using either new statutes or finalized regulations: (1) ex-
plicit and tacit commitments not to enforce laws against energy sources fa-
vored by government policy, such as wind power generators;" (2) extreme
legislative proposals, such as President Obama's proposed $10 per barrel oil
tax;64 and (3) unprecedented use of executive authority to punish energy pro-
jects such as the Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines.6 5
Shortly after President Obama took office in 2009, his new administra-
tion moved to boost wind power by giving generators five-year "take" per-
mits, which allowed them to harm or kill eagles if it was unavoidable." These
wind generators might otherwise have faced stiff penalties under the Bald
and Golden Eagle Protection Act." In 2013, the Fish and Wildlife Service
extended the permit term to thirty years, and seemingly softened the "una-
voidable" standard by promising, instead, that "[a]daptive management"
would "offset predicted detrimental impacts to eagles throughout the [30-
year] life of the permit.""
These thirty-year permits, of course, encourage investment in wind
power, providing certainty for facilities that are usually assessed on a 20-year
timeline." At the same time, the permits undercut the protections of the Bald
and Golden Eagle Protection Act passed by Congress and signed by President
Roosevelt in 1940. The American Bird Conservancy and other plaintiffs
challenged the rule that authorized the permits in federal court, and the court
struck down the rule on the basis that the agency had not sufficiently studied
63 See, e.g., Dep't of the Interior, Eagle Permits; Take Necessary to Protect Interests in Particular
Localities [sic], 74 Fed. Reg. 46,836, 46,863 (Sep. 11, 2009) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 13, 22)
(declining to enforce a licensing requirement to protect eagles' flight paths against wind power genera-
tors).
64 See, e.g., Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: President
Obama's 21st Century Clean Transportation System (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2016/02/04/fact-sheet-president-obamas-21st-century-clean-transportation-system.
65 See, e.g., DEP'T OF STATE, RECORD OF DECISION AND NATIONAL INTEREST DETERMINATION:
TRANSCANADA KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE, L.P. APPLICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL PERMIT 28-30 (2015).
66 Eagle Permits; Take Necessary to Protect Interests in Particular Localities [sic], 74 Fed. Reg. at
46,836.
67 Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 87-884, 76 Stat. 1246 (Oct. 24, 1962) (codi-
fied as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 668, 668d (2012)).
68 Dep't of the Interior, Eagle Permits; Changes in the Regulations Governing Eagle Permitting, 78
Fed. Reg. 73,704, 73,704, 73,708 (Dec. 9, 2013) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 13, 22).
69 DEP'T OF ENERGY, WIND VISION: A NEW ERA FOR WIND POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 72,
106 (2015) ("A wind plant is typically repowered at the end of its useful life, and most original equipment
manufacturers certify turbines for a 20-year lifetime.").
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the environmental impact of the permit.7 ' The court noted that the agency's
primary justification for the rule seemed to be simply that the wind power
"industry has indicated that it desires a longer permit."" But, as in other pol-
icymaking-by-proposal contexts, the announced policy may be more im-
portant than whether the rule is ultimately upheld by the courts. Ultimately,
if the federal government is determined not to prosecute those who violate
the Eagle Protection Act, no one else will, because the Act does not have a
citizen suit provision. 72 And the administration quickly moved to again final-
ize the rule, this time with an accompanying environmental impact state-
ment.
President Obama's February 2016 proposal for a $10 tax on each barrel
of oil is another policy proposal designed to impact investment.74 Like the
administration's proposed rules," the very unlikelihood of achieving the pro-
posal seems to have encouraged the administration to make a radical opening
bid.76 Between July 2014 and January 2016, oil prices fell from over $100
per barrel to under $30 per barrel. The collapse of oil prices, of course,
meant that gasoline and heating oil consumers would find an oil-tax-induced
price hike more affordable than they would at a time of high oil prices. But
the converse is true for oil producers: low oil prices already had many on the
verge of bankruptcy." A $10 tax on $30 oil would ensure that these compa-
nies went bankrupt, and some saw a danger that these oil producers could
take the global economy with them.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, oil producers were one of very
few investments that promised a reasonable profit in the North American
70 Shearwater v. Ashe, No. 14-CV-02830-LHK, 2015 WL 4747881, at *25-26 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11,
2015).
71 Id. at 5.
72 16 U.S.C. § 668b (2012) (providing only for government prosecution, per citation to 16 U.S.C.
§ 706 (2012)).
73 Dep't of the Interior, Eagle Permits; Revisions to Regulations for Eagle Incidental Take and Take
of Eagle Nests, 81 Fed. Reg. 91,494, 91,494 (Dec. 16, 2016); see generally DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FISH
AND WILDLIFE SERV., PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE EAGLE RULE
REVISION (Dec. 2016), https://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/pdf/management/FINAL-PEIS-Permits-to-
Incidentally-Take-Eagles.pdf
74 See Fact Sheet: President Obama's 21st Century Clean Transportation System, supra note 64.
75 See supra notes 6, 17, 28-30, 49 and accompanying text.
76 Congress has repeatedly rejected calls from President Obama for a higher gasoline tax. E.g., Ed
Leefeldt, Why Obama's Oil Tax Hasn't Got a Chance, CBS MONEYWATCH (Feb. 9, 2016), https://cbs
news.com/news/why-obamas-oil-tax-hasnt-got-a-chance.
77 Share Markets Slide as Oil Price Falls Below $30, BBC (Jan. 15, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35320923.
78 Matt Egan, U.S. Oil Bankruptcies Spike 379%, CNN MONEY (Feb. 11, 2016), http://money.cnn.
com/2016/02/ll /investing/oil-prices-bankruptcies-spike/; Claire Zillman, One-Third of Oil Companies




economy.7 9 As a result, United States banks are now heavily invested in oil
producers." In fact, banks are now so dependent on oil investments that even
a major oil importer like the United States may have been harmed by the oil
price collapse-that is, markets seem to think that the losses and uncertainty
caused by bankrupt oil producers might outweigh the theoretically larger
benefits that consumers receive from lower fossil fuel prices." In theory,
global markets should also benefit when energy inputs to the economy be-
come cheaper, but so far lower oil prices have not had that effect. Financial
markets are pricing-in the risk that a huge wave of defaults in the oil industry
might threaten major banks and thus, the global economy.82
With oil producers on the brink of a fall that could take down the global
economy, it seems unwise to push them over the edge by adding a one-third
tax to their production. But again, when government actors pursue policy-
making by proposal, the proposals need not be reasonable themselves-in-
stead they are designed to nudge industry investments in the government's
preferred direction. In this case, the administration wanted to tap the brakes
on investment in the oil industry. It is nearly inconceivable that it would ac-
tually like to adopt its $10/barrel tax. Even President Obama's Secretary of
Energy refused to defend the size of the $10 per barrel tax when asked about
it publicly.8 3
The United States' Department of State's treatment of the Keystone XL
pipeline proposed by the Canadian company TransCanada again seemed
aimed more at influencing industry investment than establishing a coherent
policy. TransCanada submitted its original application for a permit to build
79 See Christine Idzelis & Craig Torres, Fed Bubble Bursts in $550 Billion of Energy Debt: Credit
Markets, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-1 l/fed-bub-
ble-bursts-in-550-billion-of-energy-debt-credit-markets ("Since early 2010, energy producers have raised
$550 billion of new bonds and loans as the Federal Reserve held borrowing costs near zero . . . .").
80 E.g., id.; Rachel Louise Ensign, Banks Face New Headache on Oil Loans, WALL ST. J. (April 12,
2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-face-massive-new-headache-on-oil-loans-1460453401.
81 See Binyamin Appelbaum, Lower Oil Prices Are Not Bringing Economic Gains, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 2016, at Al.
82 Mark Harrington, Oil Credit Crunch Could be Worse Than the Housing Crisis, CNBC (Jan. 14,
2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/14/oil-credit-crunch-could-be-worse-than-the-housing-crisis-com-
mentary.html; John Melloy, Could Oil Collapse Cause Next Credit Crisis?, CNBC (Nov. 28, 2014),
http://www.cnbc.com/2014/11/28/could-oil-collapse-cause-next-credit-crisis.html ("Everyone could suf-
fer if the collapse triggers a wave of defaults through the high-yield debt market, and in turn, hits stocks.
The first to fall: the banks that were last hit by the housing crisis."); Jordan Weissmann, Two Ways That
Low Oil Prices Are Very Clearly Hurting the Economy, SLATE (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/moneybox/2016/01/2 1/one way that low oil_pricesare very clearly hurting_the econ-
omy.html ("[D]ownstream effects are why some investors are nervous that an oil recession could balloon
into an actual recession, especially as the industry continues to retrench this year.")
83 James Osborne, Energy Secretary Faces Tough Crowd on Oil Tax, HOUS. CHRON. (Feb. 24,
2016), http://fuelfix.com/blog/2016/02/24/energy-secretary-faces-tough-crowd-on-oil-tax (when asked
about the $10 per barrel proposal "Moniz looked momentarily stunned before grinning at the audience
and saying, 'this is going to be a classic answering a different question answer').
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the pipeline in September 2008. The original application was for a pipeline
to carry up to 830,000 barrels of crude oil per day from Hardisty, Alberta to
Port Arthur, Louisiana on the United States Gulf Coast8 4 Because the pipe-
line crossed the border between the United States and Canada, standing ex-
ecutive orders required that it receive a permit from the president." Purely
domestic pipelines do not require a presidential permit and can be approved
with a generic environmental analysis that does not include a full, individu-
alized environmental impact statement.
The United States Department of State considered the application for
more than seven years before finally rejecting it in November 2015, but the
announced process changed several times over the course of the review." In
summer 2013, President Obama announced that he would not approve the
pipeline if it increased greenhouse gas emissions in Canada by enabling faster
oil production." This was a significant shift for the federal government,
which had previously declared that environmental reviews of pipeline pro-
jects should focus on the pipeline itself, rather than how it might affect up-
stream oil production or downstream oil consumption." The Department of
84 DEP'T OF STATE, RECORD OF DECISION AND NATIONAL INTEREST DETERMINATION:
TRANSCANADA KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE, L.P. APPLICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL PERMIT 2 (2015).
85 Exec. Order No. 13,337, 69 Fed. Reg. 25,299 (May 5, 2004); Exec. Order No. 11,423, 33 Fed.
Reg. 11,741 (Aug. 20, 1968).
86 See generally U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, DECISION DOCUMENT, NATIONWIDE PERMIT
(2012), www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_12_2012.pdf. See also Sierra
Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 17, 26 n.13 (D.D.C. 2013) (denying motion for
preliminary injunction against domestic crude oil pipeline because it, unlike Keystone XL, is "an entirely
domestic oil pipeline").
87 See DEP'T OF STATE, RECORD OF DECISION AND NATIONAL INTEREST DETERMINATION:
TRANSCANADA KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE, L.P. APPLICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL PERMIT 32 (2015).
88 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Climate Change at Georgetown Univ.
(June 25, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/remarks-president-climate-
change (stating that Keystone XL crude pipeline would not be approved if it would "significantly exacer-
bate the problem of carbon pollution"); James W. Coleman, Obama Climate Speech Sets New Standard
for Keystone Pipeline, ENERGY L. PROF. BLOG (July 15, 2013), http://www.energylawprof.com/?p=
62.
89 In 2009, the year after TransCanada's filed its application for Keystone XL, President Obama's
administration successfully defended the Bush administration's approval of the original Keystone pipe-
line-a smaller pipeline from Hardisty, Alberta to Patoka, Illinois-convincing a court that its decisions
was unreviewable despite the failure to consider upstream and downstream emissions. Nat. Res. Defense
Council v. U.S. Dep't of State, 658 F. Supp. 2d 105, 113 (D.D.C. 2009). In that case, the federal govern-
ment had also explained the reasons that it would not consider emissions in other countries. In full disclo-
sure, when I was in private practice, I represented TransCanada as an intervener in this lawsuit. See also
DEP'T OF STATE, SCOPING SUMMARY FOR THE KEYSTONE PIPELINE PROJECT, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT 18 tbl.2 (2006) ("The [Draft Environmental Impact Statement] addresses the reasonably fore-
seeable environmental impacts of the construction and operation of the proposed Keystone Pipeline within
the United States and is limited to the pipeline which is a transportation system. The scope of the [Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement] is necessarily limited to the scope of the proposed project and does not
extend to the supply of crude oil to the transportation system or the operation of refineries that are supplied
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State executed this new mandate, concluding that the pipeline was "unlikely
to significantly impact the rate of extraction in the oil sands," and thus un-
likely to increase greenhouse gas emissions.9 0 In fact, it concluded that re-
jecting the pipeline would actually lead to higher greenhouse gas emissions,
because if all new oil pipelines were blocked, then oil would likely travel by
rail, which would lead to higher greenhouse gas emissions than pipeline
transport.9 ' Nevertheless, Secretary of State John Kerry denied the permit be-
cause, despite this conclusion, the pipeline was "perceived as enabling fur-
ther [greenhouse gas] emissions globally."92
Changing the rules five years into a permit application might seem like
an archetypal example of haphazard and incoherent policymaking. So too,
the decision to make the decision on the basis of perception rather than the
years of analysis that were an ostensible justification for the delay. But this
back and forth can also be seen as an extremely effective method of influenc-
ing industry investment: in this case, freezing investment in crude oil
transport, while all sides waited to see if this massive pipeline would be ap-
proved. As the State Department found, rejecting the pipeline would likely
have triggered other new pipeline projects or expanded transport of oil by
railroad cars.93 By contrast, delaying a decision on the pipeline created con-
tinuing uncertainty for alternative investments. Keystone XL's capacity of
830,000 barrels per day could carry nearly one quarter of Western Canada's
oil production.94 Had it been approved in a timely fashion, the market for
transportation from Western Canada would have been saturated for years,
by it. Further, as provided in Executive Order 12114, 'Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal
Actions,' Jan. 4, 1979, a federal agency is directed to consider extra-territorial environmental impacts
only in limited circumstances not applicable here. Possible impacts of the construction or operation of the
Keystone Pipeline in Canada are properly the subject of review by appropriate Canadian governmental
entities.").
90 DEPT' OF STATE, FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE
KEYSTONE XL PROJECT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ES-16 (Jan., 2014).
91 Id. at ES-34, ES-34 tbl.ES-6. The State Department also acknowledged that if global oil prices
fell significantly (e.g., West Texas Intermediate under $75 a barrel), then rejecting the pipeline could
decrease greenhouse gas emissions because "higher transportation costs could have a substantial impact
on oil sands production levels." Id. at ES-12.
92 Dep't of State, Record of Decision and National Interest Determination: TransCanada Keystone
XL Pipeline, L.P. Application for Presidential Permit 29 (2015) (emphasis added).
93 FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE KEYSTONE XL PROJECT,
supra note 90, at ES-34 tbl.ES-6.
94 In 2015, Western Canada produced 3.68 million barrels of oil per day. CANADIAN ASSOCIATION
OF PETROLEUM PRODUCERS, CRUDE OIL: FORECAST, MARKETS & TRANSPORTATION ii (2016).
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making investment in rail transport unwise." So delay, unlike either approval
or rejection, was particularly likely to stymie investment in oil transport."
The Obama administration pursued these policies effectively on other
pipelines as well.9 7 The controversy over the Dakota Access pipeline is a
prime example. In July 2016, the United States Army Corps of Engineers
approved construction of the Dakota Access pipeline from North Dakota to
Illinois, finding that approving hundreds of crossings over federal waters and
land would have "no significant impact" on the environment." That decision
was challenged by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, which is opposed to the
pipeline, and defended by the government and the pipeline company. The
D.C. District Court denied the tribe's motion for a preliminary injunction,
ruling that the Army Corps's decision to approve the pipeline had likely com-
plied with the law." Just moments after the court issued its decision clearing
the pipeline for construction, however, the Army Corps of Engineers, the
Department of Justice, and the Department of Interior jointly announced that
the pipeline would be halted, and that the Army Corps would reconsider its
previous decisions, shocking both proponents and opponents of the pipe-
line. oo
In December 2016, the Army Corps of Engineers ultimately decided to
deny the pipeline company an easement to cross the Missouri River to allow
time to perform a full environmental impact statement that would consider
95 Total existing capacity is four million barrels per day, with current production around four million
barrels per day. Western Canada is not projected to reach 4.8 million barrels per day until 2030. Id. at ii,
23.
96 S. Joel Carlson, Understanding Government And Railroad Strategy For Crude Oil Transportation
In North America 96-97 (June 2014) (unpublished M.S. Thesis, Mass. Inst. Tech.) ("[R]ailroads should
be cautious about making investments for routes where they would be in direct competition with pipelines.
... [A]ny hesitation by the railroads in transporting crude oil is partly as a result of the uncertainty over
pipeline approval. From the perspective of President Obama, . . . this uncertainty may be desirable in
terms of slowing down possible production expansion in the oil sands . . . .").
97 See, e.g., Obama's Trans-Alaska Oil Assault, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/obamas-trans-alaska-oil-assault-1422319740. Some have suggested that by varying the strin-
gency of NEPA reviews, the administration could approximate the effect of a pollution tax on investment.
Sarah E. Light, NEPA's Footprint: Information Disclosure as a Quasi-Carbon Tax on Agencies, 87 TUL.
L. REV. 511, 517 (2013) (recommending this approach).
98 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB), 2016 WL
4734356, at *15 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2016). Such approvals are routine under a nationwide permit decision
issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, supra note 86, at 12.
99 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 2016 WL 4734356, at * 1.
100 Id. at *26; Jack Healy & John Schwartz, U.S. Suspends Construction on Part of North Dakota
Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2016, at Al (noting that opponents considered the "news ... a stunning
development," while proponents found the move "deeply troubling [as it] could have a long-lasting
chilling effect on private infrastructure development in the United States").
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the environmental and cultural impacts of the pipeline crossing.'o' This re-
versal was particularly suprising because the government's decision reiter-
ated that it had already approved the pipeline crossing and stood by its earlier
finding, adopted after notice and comment, that the pipeline had "no signifi-
cant impact" on the environment.O 2 The new Army Corps' memo did not
explain how the government could perform a full environmental impact state-
ment if, as it continued to insist, the pipeline crossing had no significant im-
pact.o3 Nor did this four-page memo identify or explain what in its previous
twelve-hundred page environmental assessment could be expanded or ap-
proved upon.'04 Although, the Army Corps reversal was subsequently re-re-
versed by the incoming administration,o' the outgoing administration did its
best to make this return difficult by, in addition to the Army Corps memo,
simultaneously releasing a memo from the solicitor of the Department of the
Interior, which heavily criticized the Army Corps "no significant impact"
finding."' However shocking, these sudden course reversals are part and par-
cel of the federal government's increasing adeptness at influencing industry
investment through executive actions and shifting standards that can pro-
mote, delay, or frustrate industry investment.'
101 Memorandum from Jo-Ellen Darcy, Assistant Secretary of the Army, to the Commander of the
U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, Proposed Dakota Access Pipeline Crossing at Lake Oahe, North Dakota 3-4
(Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/45901 1.pdf.
102 Id. at 1, 4 ("On July 25, 2016, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) granted a permission
to applicant Dakota Access, L.L.C. under Section 14 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §
408 (Section 408 permission), for a proposed crossing of Lake Oahe, a Corps project on the Missouri
River .... The Section 408 permission was accompanied by an Environmental Assessment, as contem-
plated under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §4321-4335, and its implement
regulations.... The Environmental Assessment included a finding that granting the Section 408 permis-
sion for the proposed crossing of Lake Oahe did not constittue a major Federal action that would have
significant environmental impacts. . . . [T] his decision does not alter the Army's position that the Corps'
prior reviews and actions have comported with legal requirements.").
103 Id.
104 Id. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: DAKOTA ACCESS
PIPELINE PROJECT CROSSINGS OF FLOWAGE EASEMENTS AND FEDERAL LANDS (2016), http://cdm
16021.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/pl6021coll7/id/2801.
105 U.S. DEPT. OF THE ARMY, EASEMENT FOR FUEL CARRYING PIPELINE RIGHT-OF-WAY LOCATED
ON LAKE OAHE PROJECT, MORTON AND EMMONS COUNTIES, NORTH DAKOTA (Feb. 8, 2017),
http://www.eenews.net/assets/2017/02/09/document ew_04.pdf. This re-reversal from the Army Corps
was made in response to direction from the new administration. Presidential Memorandum Regarding
Construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline, WHITEHOUSE.Gov (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/24/presidential-memorandum-regarding-construction-dakota-ac-
cess-pipeline.
106 Memorandum from Hilary Tompkins, Solicitor of the U.S. Dept. of the Interior to Secretary of
the Army Corp. of Eng'rs regarding Tribal Treaty and Environmental Statutory Implications of the Dakota
Access Pipeline (Dec. 4, 2016), http://www.energylawprof.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/
dakota-access-solicitor-memo.pdf.
107 Indeed, the Dakota Access case is eerily similar to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's
treatment of an Oregon facility for liquefied natural gas which was first approved, and then denied the
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II. How POLICYMAKING BY PROPOSAL IS TRANSFORMING NOTICE-AND-
COMMENT RULEMAKING
Policymaking by proposal is changing the way that regulators and in-
dustry approach notice-and-comment rulemaking. It creates different, and in
some ways, unusual incentives for all parties that are transforming the famil-
iar informal rulemaking process. It is already inducing regulators to treat rule
proposals more as an. opening bid with industry, as opposed to a good faith
attempt to detail what the final rule will likely say. And it is encouraging
industry to find ways to attack the legitimacy of regulatory initiatives long
before a rule can be finalized or brought to court. Together these changes
undermine the credibility of the notice-and-comment rulemaking system that
is the foundation of the modem administrative state.
A. Proposed Rule as bpening Bid
When the point of a proposal is to influence industry investment, the
agency's approach to notice-and-comment rulemaking changes. For one
thing, an agency hoping to finalize stringent regulations will often propose
regulations that are even more stringent than its ideal end target.' 5 If industry
hopes to resist a rule, it will, to the extent possible, move only part of the way
toward compliance so that, if necessary, it can speed up investments to fully
comply. If an agency proposes a rule that is significantly more stringent than
the rule that it ultimately adopts, however, industry may end up close to the
finalized rule. This partial move toward compliance with an unrealistically
necessary permit to build a pipeline to bring gas to the facility for export. Jordan Cove Energy Project,
L.P., 154 FERC161,190 (Mar. 11, 2016) (denying application for certificate and Section 3 authorization).
See also Jonathan Crawford & Naureen Malik, U.S. Rejects Multibillion-Dollar Jordan Cove Gas Export
Plan, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-1 1/u-s-rejects-
veresen-s-5-3-billion-jordan-cove-gas-export-plan.
In another area, the same pattern can be seen in the Obama administration's treatment treatment
of the proposal for storing nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1983) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq.),
established a process for determining sites for storing nuclear waste. Since 1987 the focus of that process
has been, by Congressional designation, Yucca Mountain in Nevada. Bruce R. Huber, Checks, Balances,
and Nuclear Waste, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 19-20), https://pa-
pers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2820706. But the Obama administration, while unable to alter
these statutes has made killing the project a key goal. Id. at 21-24. Toward this end it has adopted a wide
range of tactics including cutting off all funding for implementing the process and withdrawing the De-
partment of Energy's siting application with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Id. Remarkably, the
government asked that the application be withdrawn with prejudice. Id. at 20. Finally, when the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission appeared deadlocked, which would prevent this withdrawal, its chair, who had
been appointed by President Obama simply refused to report the deadlock, leaving the application in
limbo. Id. For a full review of the remarkable Yucca Mountain story, see Id. at 19-24.
108 See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
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stringent proposal creates three benefits for the agency. First, it moves indus-
try more quickly toward compliance with a more reasonable final rule. Se-
cond, industry will have little reason to resist a rule with which it is already
complying. Third, industry that is in compliance may actually end up sup-
porting the agency's final rule as an advantage over competitors that have
lagged behind in investing toward compliance.
Furthermore, although one might expect an agency to begin cautiously
when promulgating a rule with a tenuous legal basis, an agency that has in-
ternalized the incentives of policymaking-by-proposal will actually make its
proposal more aggressive precisely when the rule is most likely to be struck
down by the courts. This counterintuitive incentive occurs because industry
will discount the threat from a regulation that may well be struck down in
court. So industry will only make limited investments to move toward com-
pliance: hedging its bets so it does not invest too much toward complying
with a rule that could be struck down, but also making enough investments
that it will be able to comply if the rule is upheld. If an agency proposal is
sufficiently aggressive, an industry will have to make significant investments
to give it any hope of compliance, even if it believes the rule is likely to be
struck down by the courts. Thus when the legal foundation for a regulatory
initiative is in doubt, agencies have an incentive to propose more stringent
rules to ensure that even a doubtful industry invests toward compliance. An
aggressive proposal based on a tenuous legal theory is the agency's way of
telling industry, "you've gotta ask yourself one question: 'Do I feel lucky?'
Well, do you, punk?""'
Thus, policymaking by proposal encourages agencies to treat proposed
rules as simply an opening bid. This is especially apparent in EPA's new
source performance standards for greenhouse gases from power plants and
its Clean Power Plan. EPA's gradual walk back of its new source perfor-
mance standards is dramatic: a proposal for 1,000 lb C0 2/MWh in 2012, fol-
lowed by a new proposal of 1,100 lb C0 2/MWh in 2014, leading to a final
109 DIRTY HARRY (Warner Bros. 1971).
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rule at 1,400-2,000 lb C0 2/MWh in 2015."' The Clean Power Plan has ex-
hibited the same dynamic: the agency initially proposed that states demon-
strate compliance by 2020;' in the final rule, EPA settled for 2022."'
B. Attacking the Legitimacy ofAgency Proposals
Companies under the threat of stringent proposals are looking for faster
ways to attack the legitimacy of agency policies than the traditional process
of waiting for the agency to publish the final rule and then waiting for the
courts to address an industry challenge. Nowhere is this more apparent than
the coal industry's response to EPA's Clean Power Plan. The coal industry
and coal states filed two separate motions for stays even before the final
Clean Power Plan has been published: one after the proposal was published
and one after EPA posted a pre-publication version of its final rule."' The
D.C. Circuit rejected both motions." 4
Industry can also attack agency proposals outside the courts. In the wake
of the Clean Power Plan, some utility representatives stated flatly that the
rule would not be finalized as proposed." Finally, if an industry thinks that
it can make a sufficiently compelling case that the proposal is invalid, it may
110 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Mod-
ified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510,
64,658 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, 98); Envtl. Prot. Agency, Standards of
Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating
Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1,430, 1,433 (proposed Jan. 8, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, 98);
Envtl. Prot. Agency, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392, 22,394 (proposed Apr. 13, 2012) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
111 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,837 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
112 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,667 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60).
113 Gavin Bade, Federal Court Refuses to Stay EPA's Clean Power Plan, UTILITY DIVE (Sept. 10,
2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/federal-court-refuses-to-stay-epas-clean-power-plan/405387/.
114 In re Murray Energy Corp, 788 F.3d 330, 339-40 (D.D.C. 2015). Industry was also able to enlist
friendly states in attacking the Clean Power Plan proposal, with some affirmatively declaring that they
would prohibit compliance with the plan. Devin Henry, Oklahoma Takes Aim at Climate Plan, THE HILL
(Apr. 30, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/240696-oklahoma-takes-aim-at-cli
mate-plan ("[Governor] Fallin's order prohibits the state's Department of Environmental Quality from
writing a strategy to reduce carbon emissions under the Clean Power Plan.").
115 Rich Heidorn Jr., Former EPA Official: Clean Power Plan Won't Survive, RTO INSIDER (Oct.
19, 2015), https://www.rtoinsider.com/former-epa-official-clean-power-plan-18582/ ("Former Environ-
mental Protection Agency official Jeff Holmstead says he hasn't made predictions on how the courts will
rule on previous environmental rules affecting the electric industry." But he also notes that "there are right
now almost certainly five justices that would vote to overturn it.").
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take the normally risky step of declaring its intention to ignore the proposal
and count on the courts to strike down the final rule.
III. RESISTING POLICYMAKING BY PROPOSAL
As the administrative state continues growing and the executive looks
for ways to increase its power in the absence of congressional action, there
is little prospect that agencies will voluntarily turn away from policymaking
by proposal. What can other actors do to restore the balance of power and the
traditional function of notice-and-comment rulemaking? State policymakers
will have to treat agency proposals with more skepticism and should not nec-
essarily approve regulated utility investments toward compliance when it is
not clear that the proposed rule will be finalized as proposed or enforceable
after review in the courts. Courts must strike down rules as arbitrary and ca-
pricious when they do not leave adequate time for compliance or base their
estimates of cost on the assumption that industry will make investments be-
fore it has had an opportunity to test the rules in court. Finally, Congress
should create a supplemental procedure, in addition to the normal process of
petitioning for review of agency rules and seeking to have them stayed, that
allows industry to post a significant bond in return for an automatic stay of
an agency rule.
A. State Policymakers Should Treat EPA Proposals with More Skepticism
As a matter of tradition and convenience, state policymakers generally
presume that federal proposals will both be finalized in a form similar to the
agency's proposal and approved by the courts. So when regulated-rate utili-
ties ask permission to make investments to ensure they can comply with a
proposal, utility boards are inclined to approve them. Similarly, when a fed-
eral agency proposal will require a state agency to alter state environmental
regulations, state regulators generally comply.
In a world of policymaking by proposal, these usual practices should be
questioned. State utility regulators should be suspicious of investments in
environmental control designed to comply with rules that have not yet been
approved by the courts. After all, utilities have every incentive to seek ap-
proval of big investments toward compliance with forthcoming rules, be-
cause those investments, if approved will mean more profits from ratepayers
in the form of higher electricity bills." 6
116 See Douglas N. Jones & Richard A. Tybout, Environmental Regulation and Electric Utility Reg-
ulation: Compatibility and Conflict, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 31,44 (1986); Jim Rossi, The Political Economy
of Energy and Its Implications for Climate Change Legislation, 84 TULANE L. REV. 379, 410 (2009).
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For example, the Clean Power Plan would require approval of major
investments by power companies in natural gas power and supply, in electric
transmission, in energy efficiency, and in renewable power." 7 State boards
should not rubber stamp rate increases to pay for these investments without
a serious inquiry into whether the Clean Power Plan will actually stand up in
court. Similarly, the Clean Power Plan pushes states to operate cap-and-trade
systems for greenhouse gas emissions from the power sector to ensure com-
pliance."' Even if states feel they must adopt their own cap-and-trade plan to
comply, they should make sure their plan does not entrench laws or monetary
interests that will prevent a timely transition away from the scheme if the
new administration withdraws EPA's rule or it is invalidated by the courts."
More broadly, states should reassess their procedures for determining
whether federal agency proposals 1) offer a fair preview of the rules that will
ultimately be finalized by agencies and 2) are likely to be upheld in court.
State utility boards should not approve investments that unduly harm con-
sumers if they are made solely to comply with anticipated rules that are, in
fact, likely never to be finalized as proposed or enforceable in court. 2 0
B. Courts Should Strike Down Rules That Do Not Leave Adequate Time
for Compliance
Courts can also play a part in ensuring that policymaking by proposal
does not provide an end run around the procedures designed to constrain the
administrative state. They should strike down regulations premised on the
assumption that industry will begin investing to comply as soon as the rule is
proposed. It is arbitrary and capricious for regulators to put industry in a sit-
uation in which it must comply with a regulation that it believes to be legally
flawed without an opportunity to test it in court. Policymaking by proposal
117 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generat-
ing Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,804-05.
118 Will Oremus, Obama's Climate Plan Is Basically Cap and Trade, SLATE MONEYBOX (Aug. 4,
2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2015/08/04/clean power plan obama-s climate plan
is cap andtrade after all.html. See also Karen Palmer & Anthony Paul, A Primer on Comprehensive
Policy Options for States to Comply with the Clean Power Plan, 5 (Resources for the Future Discussion
Paper No. DP 15-15, 2015), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/Worklmages/Download/RFF-DP-15-
15.pdf.
119 Jones & Tybout, supra note 116, at 44 ("Other things being equal, and with a rate of return at
least as high as utility stockholders could otherwise earn, the utility has an interest in adding to property,
as long as regulators include that property in the rate base .... This fact makes any investment that the
regulatory commissions find 'used and useful' for power generation, including pollution control equip-
ment, more attractive to the utility. Environmental agencies and other parties of similar interest should
take this incentive situation into account.") (footnotes omitted).
120 Of course, if the state independently believes the that the federal proposal is wise as a matter of




undercuts the purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking-whether one views those as informing the agency,1 2 1 or
increasing the legitimacy of bureaucratically imposed rules, 122 or merely cre-
ating a record on important issues for judicial review. 23
Agencies that use proposals rather than final rules to set an agenda for
industry investment forfeit the information benefits that the notice-and-com-
ment process can provide because the proposal is adopted before there is any
opportunity to take comment. 124 Courts and scholars have been sensitive to
the danger of fait accompli rulemaking in which an agency is unwilling to
adapt its proposal to valid criticisms because it has already committed to fi-
nalizing the rule as proposed,'25 whether because of pledges to other stake-
holders,1 26 previous promises to parallel-intemational regulations,'27 or settle-
ment agreements with courts.1 28 But even fait accompli rulemaking provides
a theoretical opportunity to change the agency's mind during the notice-and-
comment process. In contrast, industry lacks even this level of input into pro-
posed rules that are designed to transform industry investment.
121 Michael Asimow, Aonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 403
(1985) ("An invitation to submit comments stimulates outsiders to furnish data and other inputs, providing
a source of low-cost information to agency decisionmakers. A rule is likely to be a better product if its
drafters must consider seriously alternatives that they might have overlooked or take account of practical
problems that otherwise would crop up only after a rule goes into effect."); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Pro-
cedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1780-82 (2007); Phillip M. Kan-
nan, The Logical Outgrowth Doctrine in Rulemaking, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 213, 218 (1996) ("In addition
to opening a major source of information to the agency, notice and comment also bring to bear on the
agency powerful forces for rational decisionmaking-the objective eye of the scholar, the critical eye of
the public, and the challenging eye of interested parties."); Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling
Theory of "Hard Look" Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 761-63 (2006).
122 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits ofAggressive Judicial Review ofAgency Action,
1989 DUKE L. J. 522, 525 (1989) (explaining argument that aggressive judicial review of agency action
can improve legitimacy of administrative action).
123 E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492-93 (1992).
124 E.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, 57 F.3d 1136, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(Notice and comment is designed "to assure that the 'agency will have before it the facts and information
relevant to a particular administrative problem' (quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Home Health Agencies v.
Schweiker, 69 F.2d 932, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
125 Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 627 F.2d 1151, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(Agency member should be disqualified if "there has been a clear and convincing showing that the agency
member has an unalterably closed mind on matters critical to the disposition of the proceeding.").
126 Bill Vlasic, U.S. Sets High Long-Term Fuel Efficiency Rules for Automakers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
28, 2012, at Bl. See generally Ian C. Graig, Business-Government Collaboration, in Rulemaking: Regu-
lating Carbon Emissions from Motor Vehicles, in PROBLEM SOLVING WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR: A
PUBLIC SOLUTIONS HANDBOOK 35, 35-62 (Daniel E. Bromberg ed., 2016).
127 David Zaring, Sovereignty Mismatch and the New Administrative Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 59,
80-82 (2013).
128 Michael T. Morley, Consent ofthe Governed or Consent ofthe Government? The Problems with
Consent Decrees in Government-Defendant Cases, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 645 (2014). But see Jack
M. Beermann, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. REV. 947, 1001-02 (2003).
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Policymaking by proposal spends down the credibility of the adminis-
trative state. Technocratic agencies, composed of political appointees and ca-
reer bureaucrats, operate at a level removed from voter control. The vast lit-
erature that nevertheless defends the democratic legitimacy and utilitarian
desirability of the administrative state is often premised on the countervailing
constraints that agencies face. 129 For instance, unlike legislators, they must
explain their decisions by responding to significant counterarguments.1 30 Ad-
ditionally, their continuity across successive presidential administrations
gives them an inherent interest in the stability of agency policy."' But agency
proposals do not have to take into account counterarguments. And when
agencies use unrealistically aggressive proposals to drive investment, the un-
certainty created by these rules forfeits the benefits of stability than agency
rulemaking could otherwise provide. 3 2 Furthermore, when agency proposals
grow less realistic in an attempt to push industry investment in a preferred
direction, and when industry responds with new steps to try to pre-emptively
discredit agency proposals, both trends tend to undermine trust in agency ex-
pertise and the notice-and-comment procedure that is the backbone of the
administrative state.
Even those who take a skeptical view of the informational and legiti-
mating benefits of notice-and-comment rulemaking can acknowledge that
those procedures, at the very least, should create a record for judicial review,
which would highlight the key legal and factual debates that a court will need
to resolve to uphold or strike down the final rule.1 3 3 But policymaking by
proposal systematically undercuts this purpose as well by encouraging ag-
gressive and early proposals that often present different questions than the
questions presented by the more modest final rules. For example, EPA's ini-
tial proposal for coal power plant new source performance standards, which
set a commercially unviable standard of 1,000 lb C0 2/MWh in 2012, pre-
sented fundamentally different legal issues than its more defensible 2015 fi-
nal rule, which set a 1,400-2,000 lb C0 2/MWh standard.1 3 4
129 MCI Telecomm. Corp. 57 F.3d at 1141 (Notice and comment is designed "'to reintroduce public
participation and fairness to affected parties after governmental authority has been delegated to unrepre-
sentative agencies."' (quoting Nat '1 Assn ofHome Health Agencies, 690 F.2d at 949)).
130 See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., Bureaucracy and Representative Government, in
BUREAUCRACY AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 3, 24-28 (1996); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971). For more on the significant costs of regulatory
uncertainty, see generally Ben Bernanke, Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Cyclical Investment, 98 Q. J.
ECON. 85 (1983); Nick Bloom, et al., Uncertainty and Investment Dynamics, 74 REV. ECON. STUD. 391
(2007).
131 Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the
Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1043-44 (2006).
132 See supra notes 108-115 and accompanying text.
133 See Elliot supra note 123, at 1492-93.
134 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Mod-
ified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510,
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Similarly, EPA's final Clean Power Plan relied on entirely different le-
gal rationales than its initial proposal. Recall that EPA's ostensible authority
for the plan is an authority to set "procedure" for states to develop a "plan"
for setting standards for fossil fuel power plants that have already been
built.' Nevertheless, EPA's proposal asserted that it could actually prescribe
standards lower than those existing plants could possibly achieve.' It argued
that, instead, states should simply stop running some of these plants, and sug-
gested that states could mandate installation of additional renewable power"'
and could encourage their consumers to use less power.' These rationales
both suggested that an obscure section of the Clean Air Act had radically
changed the balance of federal and state power in energy policy: due to a
rarely-used section of the Clean Air Act, EPA had the authority to prescribe
the mix of power sources that states could use and curtail the power use of
state consumers. In contrast, EPA's final rule maintained its insistence that it
could set standards below what individual power plants could achieve, but
offered an entirely different rationale.' It no longer claimed that it could ask
states to make their consumers consume less power;'40 and it no longer made
specific projections about how much renewable power each state could man-
date, instead estimating the overall percentage of renewable power that each
of the three national energy grids could incorporate.' 4 ' As a result, the final
64,658 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); Envtl. Prot. Agency, Standards of Performance
for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed.
Reg. 22,392, 22,394 (proposed Apr. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
135 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (2012) ("The Administrator shall prescribe regulations which shall estab-
lish a procedure . . . under which each State shall submit to the Administrator a plan which (A) establishes
standards of performance for any existing source for any air pollutant (i) for which air quality criteria have
not been issued or which is not included on a list published under section 7408(a) of this title or emitted
from a source category which is regulated under section 7412 of this title but (ii) to which a standard of
performance under this section would apply if such existing source were a new source, and (B) provides
for the implementation and enforcement of such standards of performance".).
136 See discussion supra Section I.A.
137 EPA set this standard for each state by reference to the percentage of renewable power. See Envtl.
Prot. Agency, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,867 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
60).
138 Id. at 34,849.
139 See discussion supra Section I.A.
140 See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,667 (finalizing the three building blocks that went
into the proposed rule, not including the energy efficiency block); Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Clean Power Plan: Key Changes and Improvements, From Proposal to Final 3
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/fs-cpp-key-changes.pdf (last visited Nov.
6, 2016) ("The final BSER focuses on supply-side measures that reduce emissions from power plants, and
does not rely on demand-side energy efficiency (EE) as a building block.").
141 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,667.
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rule presented very different legal questions that would have to be hashed out
for the first time in court.1 4 2
To ensure that policymaking by proposal does not undercut the goals of
notice-and-comment regulation, courts should invalidate regulations that do
not leave adequate time for industry to make investments and comply after
the rule is finalized. Rules that do not provide enough time for industry to
comply are "arbitrary and capricious" under the Administrative Procedure
Act because they depend on the arbitrary power of the proposed rule rather
than on the independent force of a final rule adopted after agency delibera-
tion.1 43 Just as it is arbitrary and capricious to demand compliance with a rule
if the agency has "entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the prob-
lem" or material comments,144 so too it is arbitrary and capricious to expect
industry to invest toward compliance with a rule before the agency has con-
sidered any public comments on the rule.'4 5
Even when it is technically possible for industry to comply with regula-
tions from the date of the final rule, waiting for the final rule may raise the
cost of compliance. As a result, an agency also should not be allowed to as-
sume, for purposes of its cost benefit analysis, that industry will begin invest-
ing before the rule is finalized. Otherwise, upon finalization, the agency can
simply say that industry should have previously invested in modifications to
meet the proposed standard, so if it failed to do so, it can now comply by
shutting down. A cost-benefit analysis that assumes that industry will begin
investing toward compliance as soon as the rule is proposed is a cost-benefit
analysis that assumes that the industry does not believe the agency could
change course in response to comment. And if the agency knows that its pro-
posed rules will economically punish any company that does not move im-
mediately toward compliance, it will lead to the same credibility-destroying
cycle of unrealistically aggressive proposals and pre-emptive efforts to dis-
credit these proposals by targeted industries.' 4 6
142 For instance, rather than requiring states to mandate a percentage of renewable power, the final
rule may require sources to invest in renewable energy credits and renewable power sources in different
states and require states to monitor these investments-a fundamentally different potential impingement
on state energy authority. Id. at 64,727.
143 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
144 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Lack of agency
consideration of a comment "becomes of concern" when it is "significant enough to step over a threshold
requirement of materiality").
145 Thus, like "hard look" review or the "logical outgrowth" doctrine, this standard grows out of the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard rather than the minimum procedural requirements specified in 5
U.S.C. § 553 (2012), which only requires that a proposal be published 30 days before a rule's effective
date and does not explicitly require any congruence between the rule proposal and the final rule. See
William H. Rodgers, Jr., A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67
GEO L. J. 699, 704-08 (1979) (explaining the development of "hard look" review and how it goes well
beyond text of APA's procedural provisions).
146 See supra notes 108-115 and accompanying text.
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A separate question is how courts should treat final rules that demand
immediate investment toward compliance, even though legal challenges to
the rule may take years to resolve. Immediately effective rules are not inher-
ently arbitrary and capricious.14 7 After all, most rules are never challenged in
court.'4 8 On the other hand, regulations that impose particularly high costs or
operate in particularly contentious areas are much more likely to be chal-
lenged.'49 But even in these areas, courts should not automatically find it ar-
bitrary and capricious for the agency to make its rule immediately effective.
Regulators typically propose rules with estimated benefits in excess of their
costs, and if those estimations are accurate, then from a utilitarian perspec-
tive, final regulations should go into effect as soon as possible.' If an agency
finalizes a rule after faithful adherence to notice-and-comment procedure, the
normal judicial standards for a stay of the agency regulation are appropriate.
Under existing law, courts only issue a stay-an injunction that prevents en-
forcement of the regulation during the time that the case is litigated-if they
determine that the petitioner "is likely to succeed on the merits, . . . is likely
to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief," and "that the
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public
147 David R. Woodward & Ronald M. Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 31 ADMIN. L. REv. 329, 332-35 (1979) (discussing presumptions of validity, regularity, and cor-
rectness).
148 MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43056, COUNTING REGULATIONS: AN OVERVIEW
OF RULEMAKING, TYPES OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, AND PAGES IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER 1 (Oct. 4,
2016) ("[T]he number of final rules published each year is generally in the range of 2,500-4,500, according
to the Office of the Federal Register.").
149 Cary Coglianese, Litigating within Relationships: Disputes and Disturbance in the Regulatory
Process, 30 L. & Soc. REV. 735, 742 (1996) ("For the years 1988-90, 13 of the 28 significant and major
hazardous waste rules EPA issued ended up getting challenged in court."). While there are 2,500-4,500
final rules published each year, there are only about 200-350 "significant" and 30-75 "economically sig-
nificant" rules. Reg Stats, Regulatory Studies Center, Geo. Wash. Univ., https://regulatorystudies.
columbian.gwu.edu/reg-stats (last visited Nov. 6, 2016). Significant rules are those that may "'create a
serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency; materially
alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations
of recipients thereof; or raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President's
priorities, or the principles set forth in this Executive order"' while economically significant rules are
those that "'have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more"' or other adverse impact. Id.
(quoting Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 6 (1994)).
150 Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World ofCost-Benefit Analysis: Thirty-Six Questions (and Almost as
Many Answers), 114 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 171 (2014) ("[I]n the Administration's first three years, the net
benefits of economically significant regulations under President Obama exceeded $91 billion, more than
twenty-five times the corresponding figure under President George W. Bush, and more than six times the
corresponding figure under President Clinton.") (footnote omitted). See also Michael A. Livermore &
Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based Environmental Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1184, 1211-
17 (2014) (analyzing the net benefits of several recent air pollution rules).
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interest" weighing the petitioner's likelihood of success and the balance of
harms."'
On the other hand, courts should be wary of final agency rules that have
the hallmarks of policymaking by proposal: questionable legal basis com-
bined with overly aggressive proposals and attempts to insulate the rule from
early judicial review. Arguably, the Supreme Court's recent decision to stay
implementation of the Clean Power Plan is a sign that courts are beginning
to watch out for agency proposals following this pattern.' 5 2
C. Congress Should Adopt Legislation That Reins in Policymaking by
Proposal
Congress should pass legislation to strengthen the APA by explicitly
specifying that agencies must leave sufficient lead-time for industry to com-
ply with the rule once it is finalized. Congress should also adopt legislation
that allows an automatic stay of rulemaking during judicial review if the pe-
titioners that challenge the rule are willing to post a bond sufficient to ensure
that industry would only invoke the stay when it is reasonably confident that
the courts will ultimately determine that the rule is unlawful.
Rather than relying solely on courts to police the expanded use of poli-
cymaking by proposal through interpretation of the APA, Congress could
provide legislation to rein it in. Congress should amend the APA, which pro-
vides the procedure for notice-and-comment rulemaking, to provide that the
agency must leave sufficient time from the date the rule becomes final to the
date that the rule demands compliance for industry to make the necessary
investments.'5 3 And Congress should add a section specifying that any eco-
nomic impact assessment or cost-benefit assessment that is required by pro-
visions such as Executive Order 12,8661'5 or Clean Air Act § 317"' may not
151 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Thus it is only when the agency
has attempted to side-step the APA process by pushing industry to invest toward compliance before the
process is complete, that the APA itself is violated. For a guide to seeking preliminary relief in the context
of an environmental rules, see John D. Leshy, Interlocutory Injunctive Relief in Environmental Cases: A
Primer for the Practitioner, 6 ECOL. L. Q. 639 (1977). See also Ronald M. Levin, "Vacation" at Sea:
Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L. J. 291, 319 n.1 18 (2003)
(citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 417 U.S. 283, 311-12 (1974)).
152 West Virginia v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 136 S. Ct. 1000, 1000 (2016) (order granting stay of final
EPA rule).
153 The easiest way to do this may be simply to define the words "effective date" to mean "the earliest
date from which industry would reasonably need to begin seeking approvals, investing, or spending
money to comply with the rule." See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (2012).
154 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).




assume that industry begins to invest toward compliance before the rule is
finalized.
Congress should also adopt legislation that allows industries to automat-
ically stay application of a rule if they are willing to post a substantial bond
that would be forfeited if they are not ultimately successful in challenging
the rule. This would be particularly effective in combating the most egregious
examples of policymaking by proposal, which set particularly aggressive
standards to compensate for the flimsy legal basis for the rule.' At the same
time, it would not hold up run-of-the-mill rules that courts are likely to up-
hold. In those cases, industry would be unlikely to risk a bond on a long-shot
legal challenge. The only rules that would be held up by such a procedure
would be ones that threatened significant economic harm, and which industry
sincerely believes to be unlikely to be upheld by the courts.
This procedure would be a helpful supplement to current stay proce-
dures, because current stay procedures require the courts to do their own
weighing of the costs and benefits of a rule in an expedited setting.'" Courts
must determine whether the plaintiffs' likelihood of success and the eco-
nomic harm that they will experience in the absence of a stay outweighs the
social benefits of leaving the rule in place.' This kind of balancing of com-
plex harms that regulation can cause or prevent is exactly the kind of exercise
that courts prefer to leave to agencies.'" This leaves courts in the uncomfort-
able position of taking the agency's word on the benefits and costs of its own
regulation or accepting the contrary submissions of industry, which has its
own bias. Given that courts typically defer to the government's expertise in
calculating these costs and benefits of regulation, it is especially hard to con-
vince a court to make an independent estimate of these costs and benefits in
an expedited stay proceeding."' The great advantage of a bond requirement
is that it would not be dependent on court's questioning the agency in its area
of expertise; instead it would encourage industry's own honest assessment of
its cost of compliance and the merits of its suit. Industry would only post a
bond if it judged the economic harm from the rule to be large and the likeli-
hood of overturning it to be high. Thus, instead of forcing a court to judge
between the self-serving estimates of the agency and industry about the costs
of the rule and its likelihood of being struck down, the bond procedure would
156 See supra notes 34-36, 108-112 and accompanying text.
157 See, e.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (requiring courts to balance
equities and determine if a stay is in the public interest).
158 See, e.g., id.
159 E.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (principle
of deference to administrative interpretations).
160 Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 115 MICH. L. REv. (forth-
coming 2017) (manuscript at 27), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstractid=2808848 (sur-
veying studies on how often agencies win in published circuit decisions, which tend to include the most
serious challenges to agency rules, and reporting that rules are upheld somewhere from 68% to 77% of
the time).
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provide a signal of industry's honest prognosis of the harm from the rule and
its legal case against the rule.
If Congress provided an automatic stay option, the bond requirement
should be set at a substantial but flat rate for administrative simplicity and to
avoid gaming the system. As a matter of theory, the bond should be calcu-
lated to compensate for the harm imposed by delaying the rule, so that the
rule would be stayed only if the economic harm from a rule, weighted by the
forward-looking probability that it would later be invalidated, outweighed
the harm of delaying the environmental benefits of the rule. The problem
with following this theoretical approach-that is, calculating a bond for each
separate rule on the basis of its environmental benefits-is that the best judge
of those benefits would probably be the agency. But as one of the litigants in
any stay hearing, the agency would have every incentive to inflate this num-
ber to make the automatic stay unachievable. In theory, a court could make
an independent judgment on the appropriate size of the bond after taking ev-
idence, but this would just reintroduce the administrative and evidentiary dif-
ficulties of deciding such a central dispute on an expedited basis.
Instead, Congress should set a flat bond amount that industry would
need to post to receive an automatic stay of regulation. The appropriate size
of the bond would naturally be a subject for extended study, but something
over $1 million would likely be appropriate.
As a starting point, the most common standard for a "major" rule is one
that imposes a cost of $100 million or more on the economy. Under the Con-
gressional Review Act, an agency must give Congress a report on a final rule
anytime that the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs finds it will have "an annual effect on the economy of $100 million
or more," cause "a major increase in costs or prices," or have other "signifi-
cant adverse effects."'"' Proposed legislation, such as the REINS Act, which
would require an up-or-down vote from Congress on major rules, have also
used this $100 million dollar threshold.'6 2 Other, more aggressive proposals
have suggested further limits, such as an automatic stay for regulations with
costs over $1 billion dollars.' 6 3
If "major" rules would have an impact of $100 million dollars on the
economy, then industry should have to post a bond of (and potentially forfeit)
more than one million dollars to automatically stay a rule pending litigation.
As noted, litigation could take several years to resolve, and if the challenge
ultimately proved to be meritless, the automatic stay would forfeit millions
161 5 U.S.C. §§ 801, 804(2) (2012).
162 Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017, H.R. 26, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017)
(proposing to amend 5 U.S.C. ch. 8 to require Congressional approval for rule to take effect if the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs finds it will have "an annual cost on the economy of $100 million
or more," cause "a major increase in costs or prices," or have other "significant adverse effects" on the
economy).
163 See, e.g., Require Evaluation before Implementing Executive Wishlists Act of 2015, H.R. 3438,
114th Cong. § 2 (2015) (proposing an amendment to 5 U.S.C. to require an agency to postpone imple-
mentation of a rule with a cost of at least $1 billion pending judicial review).
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of dollars of environmental benefits. Of course, the rule would still eventu-
ally go into effect, but delaying the rule on the basis of a legal objection that
was ultimately determined to be without merit would mean adding years of
industrial pollution that could have been avoided. For this reason, proposals
for an automatic stay of very costly rules are unwise and unlikely to be
adopted. Although it might seem like common sense to take a bit more time
before adopting rules that are particularly costly to the economy, these costly
rules are generally adopted because they have particularly massive bene-
fits.'64 Thus, delaying implementation of expensive rules, although it would
put off outsize costs, would also put off outsize health benefits. Instead, rules
should only be delayed if there is some objective sign that the rule is very
likely to be found unlawful.
A requirement to post a substantial bond for an automatic stay would
ensure that it would only be invoked if petitioners believed they had a very
strong chance of success and that the operation of the rule would cause seri-
ous economic harm. Theory might suggest a bond in the tens of millions of
dollars-a reasonable price to pay to delay operation of a rule that might have
an impact of hundreds of millions of dollars. But the number should probably
be significantly lower because suits against government regulation pose a
severe collective action problem for at least two reasons. First, as in all liti-
gation, there are temptations to free-ride on the efforts of other interested
parties."' Second, the parties that are most harmed by environmental regula-
tions are the diverse consumers that pay more for products as a result of these
regulations; economists who analyze the incidence of regulatory burdens say
that the vast majority of compliance costs are passed on to consumers who
usually cannot sue to protect their interests.'66 In fact, when the costs of reg-
ulation falls mainly on regulated utilities, the utilities may pass on nearly the
164 See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 150, at 1239-47 (showing that extremely expensive Clean
Air Act rules generally have much larger estimated benefits; expected costs for rules for lead, sulfur di-
oxide, particulate matter, and sulfur dioxide emissions range from $150 million to $8.8 billion while ex-
pected benefits range from $370 million to $37 billion).
165 See David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases,
115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 847-62 (2002) (explaining why lawsuits by multiple plaintiffs against a single
defendant present a collective action problem). See also David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts:
Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 561, 564 n.15 (1987). Industries typically
try to mitigate these incentives to free-ride using trade associations that represent the industry as a whole.
See, e.g., James W. Coleman, How Cheap is Corporate Talk? Comparing Companies' Comments On
Regulations With Their Securities Disclosures, 40 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 47, 61 (2016) (listing oil and
ethanol industry trade associations). However, individual companies still face a free-rider problem in
funding these common organizations: each company would prefer that all the other companies fund efforts
on their collective behalf.
166 NICOLE V. CRAIN ET AL., SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, THE
IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON SMALL FIRMS 14 (2010) ("The report uses various methods to deter-
mine how the costs of regulations are distributed: between businesses and individuals, among sectors of
the U.S. economy, and among businesses of different sizes. . . . The difference between the initial inci-
dence and how costs are ultimately divided depends on the demand and supply elasticities in the respective
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full cost of regulation to consumers." As noted, many of these utilities may
actually favor more stringent regulation that allows them to raise rates.' A
more reasonable bond would probably be in the range of ten million dollars-
several multiples of the cost of a single lawsuit'"-so that automatic stays
would only rarely be sought but not entirely out of reach in the case of an
expensive rule of very dubious legality.' Over time, this bond requirement
could be modified to ensure that it was not used too often or too rarely.
product and input markets. The final incidence of the federal regulatory burden is likely to differ from the
initial incidence of costs."); lan W.H. Parry et al., The Incidence of Pollution Control Policies 32, (Re-
sources for the Future, Working Paper No. RFF DP 05-24, June 2005), http://www.rff.
org/files/sharepoint/Worklmages/Download/RFF-DP-05-24.pdf 23 ("Empirical studies on the extent to
which the costs of environmental policies are passed forward into higher prices of consumer products
would be extremely valuable; at present, empirical analyses typically assume 100% pass-through based
on the assumption of competitive, constant returns production.") (footnote omitted). See also Don Fuller-
ton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Incidence, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1787, 1789 (A.J. Auer-
bach & M. Feldstein eds., 2004) (explaining the concept of "incidence" in the more traditional context of
taxation, which is to "determine how the burden of a particular tax is allocated among consumers through
higher product prices, workers through a lower wage rate, or other factors of production through lower
rates of return to those factors").
167 See discussion supra Section II.A and supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
168 See discussion supra Section III.A and supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
169 A single lawsuit against a government regulation might cost significantly less than $1 million for
each party, although it often involves several parties pooling funds. Neena Satija et al., Texas vs. the Feds
- A Look at the Lawsuits, TEX. TRIB. (Jul. 27, 2016), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/07/27/
texas-federal-government-lawsuits/ (noting that Texas challenged federal government regulations in 43
lawsuits, many of them involving other state or industry partners and that Attorney General, Ken Paxton,
"provided cost estimates for 39 of those cases, which as of mid-2016 totaled about $5.9 million," or about
$150,000 per lawsuit). Thus, a requirement to post a multi-million-dollar bond would be significantly
more costly than a typical lawsuit.
170 For comparison, the most heavily regulated industries, such as electric utilities and oil and gas
spend about $100 million per year on lobbying the government about pending legislation. Thus, forfeiting
a $10 million bond due to an unsuccessful challenge would, at a stroke, add 10% to this annual budget.
Lobbying: Top Industries, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ (last vis-
ited Nov. 6, 2016) (the industry spent $3,386,870,031 from 1998-2016) (showing spending of
$2,129,331,100 and $1,847,455,425, respectively from 1998-2016, making them the third and sixth high-
est spending industries). See also Patrick McLaughlin, & Oliver Sherouse, The McLaughlin-Sherouse
List: The 10 Most-Regulated Industries of 2014, MERCATUS CTR., GEO. MASON UNIV. (Jan 21, 2016),
http://mercatus.org/publication/mclaughlin-sherouse-list-10-most-regulated-industries-2014 (finding that
the most regulated industries, as measured by restrictive language in 2014 regulations are petroleum and
coal products manufacturing and electric power generation, transmission, and distribution); Omar Al-
Ubaydli & Patrick A. McLaughlin, RegData: Numerical Database on Industry-Specific Regulations for
All US Industries and Federal Regulations, 1997-2012, 5-6 (Mercatus Ctr., Geo. Mason. Univ., Working
Paper, 2014) (explaining methodology for the Most-Regulated Industries of 2014 study). Across all in-
dustries, about $3 billion is spent on lobbying per year. Lobbying: Overview, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE
POLITICS, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2016). But, that sum is divided up over
several industries. The pharmaceuticals industry spends the most at about $182 million per year. Lobby-
ing: Top Industries, supra (the pharmaceuticals industry spent $3,455,321,774 from 1998-2016). In terms
of individual organization, one towers above all others: the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. It spends over
$60 million per year, which is three times more than any other organization. Lobbying: Top Spenders,
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The option to secure an automatic stay with a bond has a further ad-
vantage over automatic stay options that are predicated on the cost of regu-
lation: the cost of a regulation, like its benefits, is measured by the agency
for purposes of the review process. In other words, rules only hit the thresh-
old for more stringent review when the agency declares that they do. Histor-
ically, agencies have been trusted to provide accurate estimates of the cost of
regulation, but that norm has also begun to erode in the case of salient rules
fraught with political considerations. For example, in 2009 and 2010, EPA
first expanded its Clean Air Act regulations to cover greenhouse gases, a
move that the Supreme Court and commentators labeled "the single largest
expansion in the scope of the [Act] in its history.".. But, the EPA claimed
that its regulations had no economic cost at all to any industry; in fact, it
claimed that the regulations provided economic benefits to industry, because
it claimed that the only alternative to its regulations was to impose even more
stringent regulations. 17 2 The Supreme Court brushed aside this argument, but
it provides a preview of ways that agencies may increasingly try to manipu-
late cost estimates to avoid heightened procedural requirements.'7 3 By con-
trast, a bond-for-stay rule would not be frustrated by an agency's self-serving
claims about the cost of the rule; if industry thinks the rule will be particularly
costly and will be overturned in court, it can post the bond and gain the time
to challenge it in court.
CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2016) (U.S.
Chamber spent $1,277,435,680 from 1998-2016, which is about $67,233,457 per year, and 3.43 times the
next highest spender, the National Association of Realtors, which spent $372,664,930 in the same period).
A typical large trade association spends much less per year. National Association of Manufacturers Lob-
bying Totals, National Assn of Manufacturers: Lobbying Totals, 1998-2016, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE
POLITICS, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2016) (spending approximately $12M
each year from 2010 through 2015, with substantially higher amounts in 2008 ($29M) and 2009 ($27M)).
Over the same time period, the company with the greatest lobbying expenditures was General Electric,
spending $342,000,000 from 1998-2016, or $18,000,000 per year. Lobbying: Top Spenders, supra.
In recent years, big companies in the United States with the most regulatory exposure only spend around
$10M per year on lobbying. E.g., Southern Co.: Lobbying Totals, 1998-2016, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE
POLITICS, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2016) (spending approximately $13M
each year from 2005 through 2015); Exxon Mobil: Lobbying Totals, 1998-2016, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE
POLITICS, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2016) (spending approximately $12M
each year from 2010 through 2015, with substantially higher amounts in 2008 ($29M) and 2009 ($27M)).
171 Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2436 (2014) (quotation omit-
ted).
172 The EPA originally established a 100-250 tons per year threshold for pollution emission to trigger
a permitting requirement, but then created a separate threshold of 100,000 tons per year for greenhouse
gasses, which the EPA newly classified as pollutants. Because the tailoring ofthe rule relaxed pre-existing
requirements, the appellate court found there was no injury. Id. at 2444-45. For an explanation of these
standards, see James W. Coleman, Unilateral Climate Regulation, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 83, 116 &
nn. 120-121 (2014) (describing "first U.S. federal controls on greenhouse gas emissions from stationary
sources like refineries, factories, and power plants").
173 Id. at 2445.
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Of course, if industry can post a bond for an automatic stay, and agen-
cies are seeking to influence industry investment before courts can address
their rules, agencies will seek ways to avoid an automatic stay. Agencies will
continue to use alternatives to notice-and-comment rulemaking such as guid-
ance documents, direct final rules, and other creative approaches. But the
courts are accustomed to policing these methods of avoiding the notice-and-
comment process. Agencies may also try to break a single regulatory push
into multiple rules to force industry to pay a higher price if it wants a stay of
an entire agency initiative.'74 To combat this stratagem, Congress should pro-
vide that a single bond can be used to stay a group of rules so long as a court
determines that they are part of the same regulatory initiative.
CONCLUSION
Agencies are increasingly relying on proposals to drive industry invest-
ment. When industry must make long-term capital investments even before
a rule is finalized, judicial review of final rules is futile. Policymaking by
proposal is undermining the traditional function of notice-and-comment rule-
making. When the proposal rather than the final rule is driving policy, policy
is dictated by a document that has not benefited from the notice and comment
process. But most perversely, policymaking by proposal encourages agencies
to promulgate the most aggressive proposals when they have the shakiest le-
gal authority, a recipe for uncertainty as industry considers how much to in-
vest in meeting aggressive targets that are likely to be struck down by the
courts. When policymakers deliberately create uncertainty and construct ag-
gressive agendas on a flimsy legal basis, they destroy economic value and
spend down the credibility of the administrative state. State policymakers,
courts, and Congress should act to restore the balance of power in notice and
comment rulemaking, discourage agencies from relying on overly aggressive
proposals, and ensure that notice and comment rulemaking serves its pur-
pose.
174 See e.g., id at 2436-38 (describing how EPA used four inter-locking rules to add greenhouse
gases to its stationary source permitting program).
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